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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. ^ 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW, AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY. 
1. Did the trial court err in denying the Bank of Utah's 
(hereinafter Bank) motion for j.n.o.v. because the evidence was 
insufficient as a matter of law to establish that Ivan J. Heslop 
(hereinafter Heslop) was constructively discharged; the evidence 
was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that Heslop had 
an implied-in-fact contract terminable only for good cause and 
was not an employee at will; and the evidence was sufficient as 
a matter of law to establish good cause to terminate? 
Standard of Review: Is the verdict supported by 
substantial and competent evidence, is the evidence insufficient 
to support the verdict, and does the evidence clearly 
preponderate in favor of the Bank so that reasonable people 
could not differ on the outcome. W. Fiberglass v. Kirton, 
McConkie Etc., 7 89 P. 2d 34 (Utah App. 1990); Onybear v. Pro 
Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990); Canyon Country 
Store v. ffracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989); Hansen v. Stewart, 
761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988) . 
2. Did the trial court improperly admit evidence of an 
accrual account problem, the State's investigations thereof, the 
hiring and salary of Thomas Timmons, payments by the Bank to 
Peat, Marwick, wash entries made by Beutler, and terminations of 
other employees because such evidence was irrelevant under Rules 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
401 and 402, U.R.E., and/or was inadmissible under Rule 403, 
U.R.E? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion and whether a 
substantial right of the party is affected. Whitehead v. 
American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990); Rule 103, 
U.R.E.; Onyeabar v. Pro Roofing, Inc., supra; Pearce v. 
Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1985). 
3. Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the 
jury that evidence of the accrual problem and matters related 
thereto should be disregarded once Heslopfs public policy claim 
was dismissed, or in the alternative, that it was only relevant 
to the issue of good cause? 
Standard of Review: Same as stated in Issue 2; would the 
Bank have obtained a more favorable result absent the error, 
Rowley v. Graven Bros. & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P.2d 1209 
(1971) . 
4. Did the trial court err in denying the Bank's motion 
for new trial due to insufficiency of evidence? 
Standard of Review: Is the evidence insufficient to 
support the verdict, Hansen v. Stewart, supra; was the "'verdict 
plainly unreasonable and unjust1" due to "'slight and 
unconvincing1" evidence. King v. Fereday, 7 39 P. 2d 618 (Utah 
1987). 
2 
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5. Did the trial court err in denying the Bank's motion 
for new trial because of admission of prejudicial evidence and 
prejudicial arguments and misstatements by Heslopfs counsel 
during closing argument preventing the Bank from receiving a 
fair trial and constituting error in law? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. King v. Fereday, 
supra. 
6. Did the trial court err in ruling that Berube v. 
Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989), should be 
applied retroactively to the facts of this case? 
Standard of Review: Correctness of courtfs ruling. No 
particular deference should be granted the trial court's 
conclusion. See Scharf v. B.M.G. Corp., 700 P. 2d 1068 (Utah 
1985) . 
7. Did the trial court err in ruling that Heslop's claims 
were not barred by the statute of frauds? 
Standard of Review: Same as stated in Issue 10. 
STATUTES, AND/OR RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
IS DETERMINATIVE 
1. Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
2. Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
3. Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
4. Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
5. U.C.A. #7-1-318. 
6. Rule 59, U.R.C.P. 
7. U.C.A. #25-5-4(1). 
3 
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The foregoing rules and statutes are set forth verbatim and 
attached as Addendum 1 to the Bank's brief, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Trial Court. 
This is an employment wrongful discharge case. Heslop 
alleged that the Bank constructively discharged him in October, 
1983. Heslop further claimed he had an implied-in-fact contract 
of employment terminable only for cause, and that he was not an 
employee-at-will. 
The Bank claimed Heslop voluntarily resigned, and that he 
was an employee-at-will who could be terminated without cause. 
Finally, the Bank asserted there was good cause to terminate. 
Heslop filed suit in June, 1987. He asserted seven causes 
of action. (Record on Appeal, hereinafter R., 1-12) The trial 
court dismissed Heslop's cause of action for defamation by order 
dated May 25, 1989. (R. 250-51) By order and judgment dated 
July 10, 1989, the court granted the Bank's motion for summary 
judgment as to Heslop's causes of action for promissory 
estoppel, breach of implied-in-law covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
In the same order, the trial court ruled that Berube v. Fashion 
Centre, Ltd., supra, should be applied retroactively to the 
case. (R. 359-61) A copy of this Order and Judgment is 
attached as Addendum 2. 
4 
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An additional partial summary judgment was entered by the 
trial court on May 23, 1990, dismissing Heslop's cause of action 
for tortious wrongful discharge, including all claims for tort 
damages and punitive damages. (R. 475-76) 
The claims which remained for trial were whether Heslop was 
constructively discharged, whether he had an implied-in-fact 
contract terminable only for cause, whether he had been 
terminated in violation of public policy, and whether there was 
good cause to terminate. At the end of Heslop's case in chief, 
the court granted the Bank's motion to dismiss Heslop's public 
policy claim. (Transcript on Appeal, hereinafter Tr., 1149-51) 
At the conclusion of all evidence, the Bank moved for a directed 
verdict on the grounds that Heslop's claims were barred by the 
statute of frauds, that there was no constructive discharge or 
implied-in-fact contract and that the Bank had good cause to 
terminate Heslop, as a matter of law. (Tr. 1544-45) The court 
denied the motion on the issue of good cause and took the 
remainder of the motion under advisement pending the jury's 
verdict. The court stated it was a very close question on 
whether to grant the motion on the constructive discharge issue. 
The only evidence that corroborated Heslop's testimony that he 
was asked to resign was Heslop's own resignation letter which 
began: "Pursuant to your request". (Tr. 1552-53, 1559-61) 
The jury returned a special verdict, finding Heslop did not 
voluntarily resign, that he had an implied-in-fact contract, 
5 
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that the Bank did not have good cause to terminate him, and that 
he had been damaged in the amount of $160,000. (R. 644-45) 
Judgment on the verdict was signed on August 27, 1990. (R. 
648a-648b) Copy attached as Addendum 3. The court denied the 
Bank's motion for j.n.o.v. or in the alternative for new trial 
by order dated October 16, 1990. (R. 1182-85) Copy attached as 
Addendum 4. Defendant's Notice of Appeal was filed November 13, 
1990. (R. 1186-87) Copy attached as Addendum 5. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Heslop's Employment Background and the 
Bank's Employment Policy and Practice. 
Heslop was first employed at the Bank in 1955. (Tr. 112) 
He worked there until 1959 when he left to take a different job. 
(Tr. 112) When Heslop was hired in 1955, he signed an 
employment application (Tr. 113; Exh. 1-P), in which he 
expressly agreed that his continued employment "will depend upon 
my usefulness to the bank, in its sole discretion; the bank 
reserving the right to release me without notice, its obligation 
ending with the payment of salary through the last day I work." 
(Tr. 114; Exh. 1-P) 
Heslop was rehired by the Bank in 1962. (Tr. 112) He 
testified he discussed the terms of his rehire with Rod Browning 
and Bill Beutler, both officers of the Bank. (Tr. 116-119) 
Heslop's understanding was that he had an employment contract to 
work until he retired at age 65, unless there was good cause to 
terminate. (Tr. 296) Heslop was not asked to sign another 
6 
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employment application/agreement when he was rehired in 1962. 
(Tr. 119) 
Heslop testified Beutler told him the Bank's policy was to 
terminate employees only for good cause, or when there was a 
major reduction in force. (Tr. 120, 296) Beutler had no 
recollection of any details of what he discussed with Heslop in 
1962. (Tr. 881) Specifically, Beutler had no recollection of 
ever telling Heslop he had an employment contract until 
retirement which could only be terminated for cause. (Tr. 887) 
During all the years Beutler was employed at the Bank, he never 
heard Frank Browning, who was president and chairman of the 
board, or later Rod Browning, who became board chairman and 
president of the Bank, say the Bank's policy was that employees 
could only be terminated for cause. (Tr. 886) Beutler was 
himself in charge of personnel at the Bank for many years. (Tr. 
880) He could not recall any instance where he said, nor was he 
aware of any instance where anyone else at the Bank ever said, 
that an employee could only be terminated for good cause. (Tr. 
919) 
When Heslop was rehired in 1962, no one from the Bank 
committed to him that he was being hired for six months, a year, 
six years, ten years, or any fixed period of time. (Tr. 293) 
It was not the Bank's practice to have re-hired employees 
sign another employment application. The original personnel 
file and the original employment application/agreement were 
7 
( 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
revived. (Tr. 884-85, 1016-17) Several employees or former 
employees of the Bank testified at trial. All of them signed an 
employment application/agreement which contained the same at-
will language as Heslop's. These included Beutler on July 2, 
1957 (Tr. 881-82; Exh. 68-D), Boyd Carlsen on March 9, 1960 (Tr. 
741-42; Exh. 63-D), V. Ray Kennedy on November 16, 1956 (Tr. 
1354-55; Exh. 87-D), Edward G. Kleyn in February, 1974 (Tr. 792; 
Exh. 64-D), James K. Packer on January 15, 1958 (Tr. 634-35; 
Exh. 58-D), Gerald Peacock on October 24, 1975 (Tr. 693-94; Exh. 
61-D), Gerald R. West in November, 1961 (Tr. 542-44; Exh. 57-D), 
and Roy Nelson on December 22, 1954 (Tr. 1433-34; Exh. 90-D). 
At the time of trial, all of the above-named witnesses except 
Kennedy and Nelson were no longer employed by the Bank. 
The Bank's existing personnel records include files on six 
or eight re-hired employees. In every case, the Bank 
reactivated and used the original employment application for 
that employee. (Tr. 14 34) For example, this happened with both 
Gerald Peacock (Tr. 693-94) and Ray Kennedy (Tr. 1354-56), as 
well as Heslop. 
The Bankfs present employment application, which has been 
in use for several years, contains the same basic employment-at-
will language as all the other employment applications referred 
to above. (Tr. 1015-16, 1434-36; Exh. 91-D) Roy Nelson, 
president and chief operating officer of the Bank since 
8 
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December, 1985, testified this reflects the Bank's policy 
regarding employment. (Tr. 1372, 14 36) 
Rod Browning is the controlling owner of the Bank. He owns 
100% of the stock in Browning Bank Corporation, a holding 
company which owns 66% of the Bank's stock. (Tr. 1012) 
Browning is chairman of the board. He was actively involved in 
hiring for a number of years in the 1960's and part of the 
1970 fs. He never told any employees they could only be 
terminated for cause. (Tr. 1017-18) As a practical matter, 
however, over the years, the Bank has typically never fired 
anyone without a reason. (Tr. 1018) 
Several former employees of the Bank testified their 
understanding of Bank personnel policy was that they could only 
be fired for cause. (See Tr. 508, 620, 642-43, 704, 1364) 
Gerald West testified he understood the language in the 
employment application meant his employment with the Bank could 
be terminated at the Bank's discretion. He was never given 
anything in writing which rescinded or changed that provision. 
(Tr. 544) 
Heslop was rehired as a loan officer in the installment and 
commercial loan departments. (Tr. 121) He was made an 
assistant vice president in 196 3 and became a vice president in 
1966. In 1976, he was appointed to the Officers Executive 
Committee (OEC). In 1980, Heslop was appointed senior vice 
9 
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president and manager of the Bank's commercial and installment 
loan operations in the Salt Lake Division. (Tr. 121-22, 124) 
2. Accrual Account Problems and Heslop's 
First Offer to Resign. 
The OEC oversaw general operations of the Bank on a day-to-
day basis. It held regular weekly meetings and also met each 
month with the Bank's Directors Executive Committee (DEC). The 
DEC consisted of five directors involved in setting Bank policy 
and reviewing major decisions. (Tr. 124) 
Beutler was chairman of the OEC. In spring of 1981, he 
reported to the OEC a $200,000 deficiency in the time 
certificate of deposit interest accrual expense account. (Tr. 
129) This was an internal account at the Bank. It was used to 
maintain a running total of the amount of interest the Bank owed 
on time certificates of deposit purchased by Bank customers. 
(See Tr. 130-31) 
In November, 1981, at a regular OEC meeting, Heslop asked 
Beutler if the accrual deficiency had been corrected. Beutler 
said it had not, and was now $500,000 or $1,000,000. (Tr. 135) 
Beutler and Heslop argued about whether to report the 
matter to Browning. Heslop thought it should be reported. 
Beutler did not. (Tr. 135) A couple of days later, the OEC met 
with Browning. The accrual problem was not mentioned. Later 
that day, Heslop called Browning and reported the problem. 
Heslop also offered to resign because he was concerned Beutler 
would think he had gone behind his back to Browning. Browning 
10 
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told Heslop not to resign and that he would handle the problem 
from there on. (Tr. 136, 1020-21) 
There were two methods of correcting the accrual account 
deficiency. One was to take an immediate one-time charge 
against the Bank's undivided profits in an amount equal to the 
total deficiency. The other method was to make monthly, 
installment charges against undivided profits until the entire 
deficiency was eliminated. (Tr. 138-39, 325, 906, 1026) Heslop 
favored taking a one-time charge. Beutler recommended the 
monthly, installment method. (Tr. 138-39, 325) Beutler told 
the OEC he had consulted with the Bank's outside accounting firm 
of Fox & Company who had advised him the deficiency could be 
cleared by use of the installment method. (Tr. 336, 338, 589) 
James Packer and Ray Kennedy, the two other members of the OEC, 
followed Beutler»s recommendation. (Tr. 590-92) 
At the end of each calendar quarter, the Bank was required 
to file a call report setting forth its financial condition with 
the State Department of Financial Institutions. 
On December 4, 1981, the OEC met with the DEC. (Tr. 240) 
During this meeting, Beutler explained the accrual deficiency. 
He said it amounted to approximately $700,000. Beutler 
presented the two methods of resolving the deficiency, reported 
Fox & Company's approval of either method, and recommended the 
installment method, which was adopted by the DEC. (Tr. 145, 
342-43, 626-27, 845-46, 905-07, 1026-27, 1346, 1459-61) Beutler 
11 
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said the deficiency could be resolved in about six months. (Tr. 
1026-27) Heslop did not object to use of the installment method 
during this December 4 meeting. He did not recommend a one-time 
charge. He did not say the Bank's call reports would be false 
and inaccurate if the deficiency was corrected over time. (Tr. 
343-44, 1027-28, 1346) Heslop subsequently prepared personal 
notes detailing the accrual account problem and other Bank 
matters. In his notes, he claimed he believed the installment 
method was a violation of Utah law. Nonetheless, he did not say 
that at the December 4 meeting. (See Exh. 39-P) 
No one in attendance at the December 4, 1981, DEC meeting 
suggested that handling the deficiency on a monthly basis was 
illegal. (Tr. 345) All of the Directors on the DEC and also 
Heslop had confidence in Beutler, who had been preparing the 
Bank's call reports for a long time. (Tr. 347-48, 626, 627, 
880) Browning relied on Beutler to prepare them. (Tr. 880, 
1033-34) Browning believed it was perfectly proper to handle 
the accrual problem over time. (Tr. 1033-34) 
Beutler did not believe the installment method was illegal 
or improper. He believed the DEC adopted it in good faith. He 
did not think any of them would intentionally break the law. 
Beutler did not think the December, 1981, March, 1982, and June, 
1982, call reports he prepared were false, misleading, or 
intended to deceive. (Tr. 905-09) 
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Without knowledge of the DEC, Beutler, both before and 
after the December 4, 1981, meeting made "wash entries" to the 
accrual account when the quarterly call reports were due. A 
wash entry consisted of a book transfer of funds from one 
internal bank account to the interest accrual account a day or 
so before the date of the call report and a subsequent reversal 
transfer of the same funds back to the original account a day or 
two after the date of the call report. The purpose of the wash 
entry was to prevent bank regulators from seeing the accrual 
deficiency. (Tr. 832-33) The wash entries hid the TCD accrual 
accounts. (Tr. 681) Beutler nonetheless never told the DEC 
that handling the deficiency on a monthly basis was improper. 
(Tr. 905-09) 
In July, 1982, Beutler notified the federal and state bank 
regulators of the accrual account problem and the method being 
used by the Bank to resolve the problem. (Tr. 349, 858-60, 911-
12; Exh. 47-D) 
Beutler reported to the Board and/or DEC that the 
deficiency would be reduced to $80,000 by August, 1982, and was 
basically taken care of. (Tr. 601-02) 
On August 2, 19 82, the federal and state bank examiners 
started a regular examination of the Bank. (Tr. 350) The 
accrual account problem was investigated. It was determined that 
deficiencies existed which were much greater than Beutler had 
ever disclosed to the DEC or the OEC. (See Tr. 680, 982) 
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On August 6, 1982, Elaine Weis, Commissioner of the State 
Department of Financial Institutions, called a special meeting 
of the Bank's Board of Directors. Several regulatory people 
were present, including representatives from the Utah State 
Attorney General's Office and the Federal Reserve. (Tr. 598-99, 
1039-40, 1445). Weis issued an order suspending Beutler as 
executive vice president and director, requiring an immediate 
outside audit of the Bank, requiring that a representative of 
the Commissioner be placed in residence in the Bank, requiring 
the Bank to file corrected call reports for December 31, 1981, 
March 31 and June 30, 1982, and specifically finding that 
Beutler had violated £7-1-318, Utah Code Ann., relating to the 
filing of false call reports. The order stated Beutler knew the 
amounts shown in the accrued interest account were understated 
by approximately $1.5 million at various times since October, 
1981. (Exh. 67-P) Dee Hutzley, one of the Bank's directors, 
spoke at this meeting on behalf of the other directors. He 
stated that they were all aware of the accrual problem and that 
it would be entirely resolved within the next month. (Tr. 599, 
1040, 1446) 
When the regulators indicated the deficiency was $1,000,000 
or more, the Directors were in a state of shock and surprise. 
(Tr. 628-29, 1040-41, 1446) 
Ron Draughon, one of the state bank examiners, recommended 
to Weis that Beutler be suspended because the call reports were 
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inaccurate, and Beutler accepted responsibility for the 
inaccuracy. Draughon did not recommend that Browning be 
suspended because Beutler admitted he had control of the 
financial statements and was the person who put the financial 
statements together, not Browning. (Tr. 984-86) Beutler 
admitted at the August 6, 1982, meeting that preparing call 
reports was his responsibility. (Tr. 1041-42) 
After the Commissioner's order was issued, while Draughon 
was still in the Bank, he spoke with Browning and Kunz. He was 
not conducting an investigation at this time, because that was 
the Attorney General's job. Out of curiosity, Draughon asked 
Browning and Kunz whether they were aware of the magnitude of 
the accrual deficiency before the examination started. They 
both indicated they were not. (Tr. 976-78) Draughon asked 
Browning and Kunz this question after Draughon had already 
discovered a much larger accrual deficiency than had been 
reported by Beutler. (Tr. 990-91) 
The Bank hired Peat, Marwick and Mitchell to perform a 
complete audit. The partner in charge was Thomas Timmons. (Tr. 
151-52, 1229) The audit began in August, 1982, the work was 
completed by the end of October, 1982 and the reports were 
delivered to the Bank in early December, 1982. (Tr. 1229-30) 
Peat, Marwick found various accounting errors during its 
audit, including the accrual account deficiency. Peat, Marwick 
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recommended that the errors be corrected at one time—the same 
recommendation as Heslop made in 1981. (Tr. 152-53) 
By order of Commissioner Weis dated February 23, 1983, all 
restrictions placed on the Bank in the August 6, 1982, order 
were removed. (Tr. 496-98; Exh. 56-D) 
3. Attorney General Investigation. 
Following Beutler's suspension, the Utah Attorney General's 
Office (hereinafter Attorney General) conducted an investigation 
of the Bank to determine if there was any criminal wrongdoing. 
(Tr. 153-54) The Attorney General interviewed Ray Kennedy, Jim 
Packer, David Kunz, and Tom Timmons. (Tr. 602-03, 1325, 1522-
23) Through its investigation, the Attorney General learned 
about the December 4, 1981, DEC meeting, Beutler's explanation 
of the two methods to handle the accrual deficiency, and the 
DEC'S decision to adopt the monthly approach for resolving the 
problem. The Attorney General further learned that the DEC 
received progress reports each month from Beutler concerning his 
handling of the deficiency. (Tr. 603, 1522-23) 
The Attorney General's investigation was over by November, 
December, or early January of 1983. (Tr. 367, 633) No charges 
were brought against the Bank or any of its officers or 
directors. (Tr. 368-69, 633, 912) 
When Timmons met with the Attorney General, he was asked 
whether the officers acted in a knowingly illegal manner, or if 
they really did not understand what they were doing. Timmons 
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told the Attorney General he believed they simply did not know 
what they were doing, and not that they had intentionally filed 
false statements. (Tr. 1326-27) 
Heslop met with the Attorney General two times. First, on 
September 13, 1982. Heslop told the Attorney General he would 
not disclose any information unless he was given a subpoena and 
unless he had counsel present. (Tr. 357) Heslop disclosed no 
information during this meeting regarding the accrual problem. 
(Tr. 154-56) 
That same evening, Heslop received a telephone call at home 
from David Kunz. Kunz asked Heslop why he met with the Attorney 
General without talking to Kunz first. Even though Heslop was 
a senior vice president at the Bank, knew that the Bank was 
being investigated by the Attorney General, knew that Beutler 
had been removed as an officer of the Bank by the Commissioner, 
and felt that this investigation was a very serious matter, he 
nonetheless did not feel he owed it to the Bank to mention that 
the Attorney General had asked him to meet before attending the 
September 13 meeting. (Tr. 157, 356) 
The second time Heslop met with the Attorney General was in 
November, 1982. He was accompanied by Wayne Black, who had been 
retained to represent the Bank. At this meeting, Black told the 
Attorney General the Bank admitted there were errors in the call 
report of December 31, 1981. He indicated there was confusion 
among the Bank's management as to how the accrual problem should 
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be handled. He further stated that "Ivan is an activist. He 
wanted to take certain action right now. Others wanted to take 
a more methodical approach." Heslop told the Attorney General 
he did not think any of the directors signed the call reports 
with intent to defraud and that they were acting on the 
information given them. Heslop also said no one had taken any 
money from the Bank. (Tr. 171, 17 3) 
Heslop thereafter called the Attorney General to find out 
the status of the investigation. He was told it was being 
closed, and that no charges would be brought. Heslop expressed 
some concern about that because he felt it left him in a bad 
position with his peers at the Bank. The Attorney General told 
Heslop if he was withholding any information, he should tell 
them about it. Heslop told the Attorney General, "I think you 
know basically the information I have, only I am asking it be 
received by subpoena." The Attorney General said there was no 
plan to issue any subpoenaes. (Tr. 175-76) 
At no time did Heslop ever give any of his personal notes 
to the Attorney General. Nor did he ever discuss the contents 
of his notes with the Attorney General. (Tr. 384-85) 
4. Hiring of Tom Timmons. 
During August, September, and October, 1982, Browning and 
Kunz met with federal bank regulators. The regulators were 
concerned about the Bank's loans, capital and management and 
wanted the Bank to hire someone with a strong accounting 
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background to straighten out the Bankfs books because the Bank's 
officers were weak in accounting. The regulators also said the 
Bank needed someone with good executive skills. (Tr. 1045-47, 
1049, 1466-67) 
As a result, the DEC began looking for a person who could 
fill this function. (Tr. 1047-48) Consideration was given to 
Packer, Kennedy, and Heslop, but the committee decided none of 
them had the necessary skills. (Tr. 1048) 
The Peat, Marwick audit was going forward during this same 
time frame. The DEC members, and specifically Browning, were 
impressed with Timmons. (Tr. 1051) In addition to the audit 
work, Timmons also provided information for Kunz and Browning 
with respect to raising additional capital for the Bank. 
Raising capital involved complex Federal Reserve regulatory 
provisions under the Bank Holding Company Act. Kunz learned 
that Timmons had extensive experience in auditing banks and 
other financial institutions, and also in dealing with 
regulatory matters with the State and the Federal Reserve. (Tr. 
1468-69) 
After Peat, Marwick's audit work was complete, Browning and 
Kunz talked to Timmons about employment as president of the 
Bank. (Tr. 1049-50, 1052, 1240-41) These discussions were not 
held until Kunz confirmed that Timmons was completely finished 
with all his work on the audit. (Tr. 1470-71) 
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Timmons initially told Kunz he was not interested in the 
job. (Tr. 1241-42) One of the reasons was because of his large 
income and potential income at Peat, Marwick. Within 3 or 4 
years, Timmons expected to be earning $225,000 to $250,000 a 
year. (Tr. 1239-40, 1241-43) After further discussion Timmons 
changed his mind and was ultimately hired. He signed a five-
year employment contract on December 17, 1982, and became 
president and CEO effective January 15, 1983. (Tr. 1053; Exh. 
83-P) -
Before accepting the Bank's offer, Timmons conferred 
with Peat, Marwickfs Salt Lake City managing partner, as well as 
Peat, Marwickfs head office in New York City. The Salt Lake 
City managing partner did a complete partner review of Timmons' 
audit of the Bank, confirmed that it was performed according to 
professional standards and that all conclusions were adequately 
supported. (Tr. 1244-45) 
Bank regulators have a system of rating banks from 1 to 5; 
1 is the highest rating and 5 is the lowest. When Timmons 
became president of the Bank, it had a 5 rating. When he left 
the Bank three years later, its rating was a 2. (Tr. 1269-70) 
Timmons1 starting salary at the Bank was $150,000, with a 
10% annual increase and a provision for a bonus tied into Bank 
profits. (Tr. 1472-73) 
When Timmons became president, the Bank did not meet 
regulatory requirements regarding capital. The Bank was 
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therefore required to input more capital. Browning, along with 
other members of the board, came up with the additional money 
and infusion of capital. (Tr. 665-66) 
5. Reorganization of the Bank and Heslopfs 
Second Offer to Resign. 
Between the time Timmons signed his contract on December 
17, 1982, and the time he officially began his duties in mid-
January, 198 3, he met and had discussions with Browning and 
other members of the Board regarding the Bank's organization. 
Sweeping changes were made because the Bank needed a complete 
reorganization to improve its loan quality and internal 
accounting operations. (Tr. 1053-54, 1247-48) Reassignments of 
top management positions were made with the approval of 
Browning and the Board. (Tr. 1056, 1065-66, 1248, 1474; Exh. 
77-D and 78-D) The DEC did not just review Timmons1 proposed 
reorganization, but actually had more input on the changes than 
Timmons did. (Tr. 1324) 
Included among the changes was the disbanding of the OEC 
(Tr. 1056) Almost every senior officer was involved in some 
change of assignment. (Tr. 147 3) 
Jim Packer was removed as the Northern Division commercial 
loan department head and put in charge of marketing and business 
development. Packer had been a commercial loan officer for most 
of his career. After the reorganization, Packer had no lending 
authority. (Tr. 637-38, 1057, 1249) 
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Ray Kennedy had been manager of the real estate loan 
department. Another person was brought in to head that 
department. (Tr. 6 38) Even Browning's title was changed. He 
no longer was president and chief executive officer, but 
remained chairman of the board. (Tr. 1057-58) 
Heslop was moved from the Salt Lake City office back to the 
Bank's main office in Ogden to work as a commercial loan officer 
and agricultural loan specialist. He retained his title as 
senior vice president and his same salary. (Tr. 369-70, 376, 
1054-55, 1249-50) 
Heslop had more experience with agricultural lending than 
any other loan officer at the Bank. The Bank had a lot of 
distressed agricultural loans at this time. It was important to 
have someone with Heslop's expertise to help with distressed 
agricultural loans. (Tr. 547, 781, 1249-50) 
Even before Beutler was removed as executive vice 
president, the Bank had been required to enter into a memorandum 
of understanding with the Federal Reserve because of various 
problems at the Bank, including capitalization and problem 
loans. This memorandum required the Bank to make various 
changes as well as to make periodic status reports to the 
regulators. (Tr. 636, 782, 1042-43) 
Heslop knew the regulators had told the Bank it needed to 
reorganize. Heslop understood that was exactly what Timmons was 
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doing so that another accrual-type problem did not occur. (Tr. 
371-72) 
Heslopfs lending authority on secured loans was increased 
after Timmons became president from $30,000 to $50,000. (Tr. 
392-95; Exh. 48-D, 49-D, and 50-D) 
When Timmons explained Heslop's new assignment to him in 
early January, 198 3, Heslop objected to the change. He 
considered it a demotion. (Tr. 193, 1250-51) Timmons said it 
was not a demotion. His only reason for reassigning Heslop was 
to help the Bank. (Tr. 369-70, 1255-56) 
Heslop subsequently met with Browning on the weekend before 
the Bank's annual stockholders meeting in January, 198 3. He 
again objected to the new assignment and offered to resign. 
Browning specifically told Heslop not to resign and encouraged 
him to stay on as an employee, which Heslop did. Browning also 
told Heslop the change was a lateral transfer and was in the 
best interest of the Bank. (Tr. 193-94, 196-97, 374-75, 1058-
60) Browning felt the Bank always had the right to change an 
employee's assignment. This occurred many times over the years 
to both middle and senior management personnel. (Tr. 1018-19) 
Heslop continued to work as a commercial loan officer and 
agricultural loan specialist from January of 198 3 until October 
of 1983. 
Timmons was unaware at the time of the reorganization that 
Heslop had opposed the installment method for handling the 
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accrual account deficiency. He did not learn until March or 
April of 1983 that Heslop supported a one-time charge, (Tr. 388, 
1251-52), which was the same solution Timmons required as part 
of Peat, Marwick's audit in the fall of 1982. 
The Bank had two reductions of force in 1983. A small one 
occurred in the spring and a larger one in the fall. Heslop was 
not included in either. (Tr. 636-37, 1067-68) 
6. New Loan Policy. 
The Board adopted a written loan policy in April, 1983. 
(Tr. 1256-57, 1474) The policy restricted new agricultural 
loans. They were considered undesirable because the Bank had so 
many existing problem agricultural loans. The Bank wanted its 
officer's to be very prudent in making new agricultural loans. 
(Tr. 565, 782-83) 
Loan policy 13 listed desirable and undesirable loans. 
Undesirable loans included loans to establish a new business 
enterprise, if repayment of the loan was dependent solely upon 
the profitable future operation of the enterprise, in the 
absence of supporting additional collateral or financially 
substantial guarantors; and loans whose repayment was dependent 
solely upon the marketing of a growing crop or livestock, in the 
absence of supporting additional collateral or financially 
substantial guarantors. Loan committee approval of all 
undesirable loans was specifically required. (Exh. 17-P) 
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It is the responsibility of a loan officer to make loans 
within the scope of the policy set by the Bank. If he fails to 
do that, then he is not acting within his lending authority. 
(Tr. 564) 
The new loan policy allowed loan officers to combine their 
lending authority to approve loans. This was designed to take 
care of rush-type situations. In most instances., Timmons and 
the directors wanted loans to go through a loan committee 
approval process. (Tr. 395, 1273-74; Exh. 50-D) 
7. Gabbert Loan. 
In early August of 1983, Heslop was approached by a man 
named Larry Richins regarding a $260,000 loan application for 
Dr. Clayton Gabbert. The loan was to be used by Gabbert to 
purchase 310 head of cattle which he would then lease to Richins 
who was going to operate a dairy in Newton, Utah. Richins1 
lease payments to Gabbert were to be used by Gabbert to make his 
loan payments to the Bank. (Tr. 20 3-04) 
After Heslopfs initial presentation to the loan committee, 
Heslop was asked to get more information about the loan, which 
was an agricultural loan. (Tr. 521, 783-84, 786) 
On August 5, 198 3, West approved the loan subject to the 
condition that Gabbert, in addition to securing the loan with 
the cattle, also either make a $50,000 cash investment of his 
own into the project or provide additional collateral in the 
amount of $50,000. (Tr. 430, 432-33, 557, 786-87, 1077, 1079, 
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1278-79, 1388-89; Exh. 7-P) Heslop was required to see that 
this condition was met before he could close and disburse the 
loan. If the condition could not be met, Heslop was obligated 
to ask West for a change in the approval, which West testified 
Heslop did not do, (Tr. 557-58, 565-66, 1395) The loan was 
approved, subject to this condition, by Heslop and West 
combining their individual lending authorities. It was not 
approved by the loan committee. (Tr. 554-55, 766-67, 784-85, 
1272-7 3; Exh. 7-P and 5 3-D) It did not meet the Bank's loan 
policy requirement of specific loan committee approval on 
undesirable loans. (Tr. 556) 
Gabbert owned property in Bountiful which he represented on 
his financial statement had a value of approximately $90,000 
with a first mortgage of approximately $38,000. (Exh. 8-P) The 
loan was scheduled to close on Monday, August 22, 198 3. On 
Friday, August 19, the Bank's appraiser appraised the Bountiful 
property at $45,000. (Exh. 12-P) He found it had a first 
mortgage of approximately $33,000. (Exh. 7-P) This left total 
equity of $12,000, but in reality the property had no "loanable 
equity", meaning there was not enough equity to feasibly use as 
collateral. The Bank would not normally take a second mortgage 
under such circumstances. (Tr. 430-31, 559-60) For the Bank to 
realize anything from the Bountiful home in case of default, it 
would have to pay $3 3,000 for the first mortgage, as well as a 
real estate commission and other costs associated with a sale. 
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The Bank would never realize even $12,000 from such a sale. 
(Tr. 431-32, 735) 
In spite of the appraisal, Heslop closed the loan on August 
22 and disbursed the funds, (Exh. 7-P) Although he took a 
second mortgage on the Bountiful property, Heslop did not meet 
the $50,000 condition. Dr. Gabbert did not invest any of his 
own money into the project. (Tr. 558, 1079-80, 1278-79, 1389) 
West had no recollection of ever telling Heslop it was okay to 
close the loan without meeting the $50,000 condition. (Tr. 559) 
West had no recollection of seeing the appraisal on Gabbertfs 
Bountiful home. He testified the loan should not have been 
disbursed in light of Heslop's failure to meet the $50,000 
condition. (Tr. 557-58) Heslop, on the contrary, testified 
West told him to commit to disburse on the loan even before the 
Bountiful property had been appraised. (Tr. 46 3) 
Bank loan policy No. 7 required all loans over $100,000 to 
have advance review and approval of supporting legal 
documentation by the Bank's counsel. Heslop did not do this 
with the Gabbert loan. (Tr. 498-99) 
Gabbertfs personal income was insufficient to make the 
payments. Specifically, his net income after federal income tax 
in 1981 was approximately $68,000 and in 1982 was approximately 
$75,000. (Exh. 10-P) The annual payment on the note totaled 
more than $72,000. (Exh. 13-P) It was essential that Richins 
make the lease payments to Gabbert from the dairy operation so 
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that Gabbert could make the loan payments to the Bank. (Tr. 
421-22, 562-64, 736-38, 1085) 
The first payment on the loan was due September 25, 1983. 
(Exh. 13-P) Richins filed for bankruptcy before that date, and 
Gabbert was unable to make his first payment. (Tr. 241, 1439) 
Richins' bankruptcy created a lot of problems for the Bank in 
trying to salvage the loan. (Tr. 768-70) Ultimately, the Bank 
and Gabbert were involved in litigation over this loan. (Tr. 
1508) 
About two weeks before the first payment came due on the 
loan, Boyd Carlsen, vice president in charge of loan review at 
the Bank, performed a routine review of the Gabbert loan. (Tr. 
701-02, 711, 713; Exh. 54-D) No one told him to single the loan 
out for special review. (Tr. 740, 1274) Carlsen prepared a 
loan review report indicating he could not give the loan a 
rating because it was inadequately documented. (Tr. 726-27; 
Exh. 62-D) His report identified various deficiencies in the 
loan. He was very critical of it. For example, the file did 
not even document that the full number of cattle was purchased 
as anticipated under the loan approval. Carlsen submitted a set 
of questions to Heslop as part of the review. One question 
asked whether additional collateral was needed. Heslop answered 
that additional collateral was not needed, and that Dr. Gabbert 
had invested $50,000 of his own money into the project. This 
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statement was clearly false. (See Tr, 442-44, 446-47, 567, 714, 
716-18, 727-34, 743, 747-48, 753-55; Exh. 15-P and 55-D) 
The Gabbert loan violated the Bank's written loan policy 
because it involved a new business undertaking (the dairy farm) 
and did not have any guarantors. (Tr. 398-401, 1086) In 
addition, it was solely dependent on the profitable future 
operation of the dairy business for repayment because Gabbert's 
personal income was inadequate to make payment. (Tr. 1088-89, 
1205) It also did not have supporting additional collateral 
because the second mortgage on the Bountiful home was worthless 
(Tr. 1089), and it was also dependent solely upon the marketing 
of milk from the dairy for repayment. (Tr. 1089-90, 1205) 
Mr. Browning's opinion was that the Gabbert loan violated 
Bank loan policy. He identified numerous problems with the 
loan. (Tr. 1069-77, 1079-86) Timmons also concluded the loan 
violated Bank loan policy for numerous reasons. (Tr. 1275-81, 
1283) Roy Nelson, the Bank's present president, who reviewed 
and analyzed the loan and testified as an expert in lending, 
also concluded it violated the Bank's loan policy. (Tr. 1388-
95) 
Browning, Timmons and Nelson all testified there is a 
significant difference between a loan that goes bad and a loan 
that violates loan policy. The Bank is willing to take the risk 
of loans that go bad when made within the scope of the lending 
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policy, but not loans that violate policy. (Tr. 1086-87, 1258-
59, 1382, 1384-85) 
8. Rescission of Heslop's Lending Authority. 
Because of the loan policy violations involved with the 
Gabbert loan, Browning and Timmons were concerned about the 
safety of the Bank's assets. They did not want Heslop making 
any more Gabbert-type loans. As an immediate, temporary 
protective measure, Timmons and Browning decided to revoke 
Heslop1s lending authority. On September 29, 1983, Timmons 
issued a memorandum to West which removed Heslopfs lending 
authority. The memo required either West or Ed Kleyn to approve 
Heslopfs loans before a commitment was made to a customer. In 
addition, West's lending authority was reduced from $250,000 to 
$100,000. The policy of allowing loan officers to combine 
lending limits was restricted so that no loan in excess of 
$100,000 could be made without prior approval of Browning, 
Timmons, or the Directors Loan Committee. This memorandum, 
therefore, affected several loan officers' authority. (Tr. 568-
69, 1091, 1283-84; Exh. 16-P) 
Both Browning and Timmons considered the rescission of 
Heslop's lending authority a temporary, stopgap measure until 
they could find out more specifics about the Gabbert loan. (Tr. 
1094-95, 1285) 
One of the reasons immediate action was necessary was 
because the Bank was still reporting, pursuant to the memorandum 
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of understanding, on a monthly basis to the Bank regulatory 
authorities on improvement of its loan portfolio. The Gabbert 
loan was a violation of the goal of improving loan quality. 
(Tr. 1091-92) Specifically, the Bank had to report on the 
status of any problem loans over $50,000. (Tr. 822-23) 
Timmons1 September 8, 1983, letter to the regulators reported 
progress in reducing past-due loans and in correcting credit 
file documentation problems found by the regulators. He further 
reported the delinquency level on loans was a primary concern at 
the Bank and that a special senior management task force had 
been formed to address and study the issue. He stated the Bank 
was implementing the committee's suggestions and anticipated 
significant improvement in loan delinquency levels during the 
remainder of 1983. (Tr. 1339-40; Exh. 86-D) The next day 
Carlsen's loan report on the Gabbert loan was issued showing 
such poor documentation that no rating could be given. (Tr. 
1341) 
Although Heslop could not independently commit to loans 
under the terms of the September 29, 1983, memorandum, he could 
still perform all other duties of a loan officer. He could 
interview and screen applicants and take loan applications, 
present loans to the loan committee for approval, assemble 
documentation and file forms and documents after approval, 
service loans after approval and disbursement, and discuss and 
give advice about loans to other officers. (Tr. 789-91, 1095-
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96, 1286) Heslop1s responsibilities as a loan officer to 
service the loan continued even after it was approved and 
disbursed. His post-disbursal responsibilities were equally 
important as the responsibilities leading up to and including 
approval. (Tr. 303-04, 306) 
Neither Browning nor Timmons intended to fire Heslop by 
removing his lending authority. Heslop retained his title as 
senior vice president, as well as his same salary. (Tr. 1094-
95, 1286) West did not think the rescission of lending 
authority was a permanent change. He told Heslop to stay on at 
the Bank and work with the change. (Tr. 569) Kleyn and Heslop 
had a good working relationship, and Kleyn told Heslop they 
could work together with the restrictions on Heslopfs lending 
authority. (Tr. 791) Although it is difficult for a loan 
officer to act with no lending authority, it does not prevent 
him from performing his job. This was especially true at the 
Bank where loan officers had a close relationship. (Tr. 774) 
Kleyn testified it is prudent for a loan officer to take a day 
to consider and think about a loan before committing on it. 
This restriction allowed Heslop to do that. (Tr. 791) 
Moreover, customers never know a loan officer's lending 
authority. (Tr. 800, 1095-96) Kleyn testified there are loan 
officers who function without independent lending authority. In 
his job at First Security Bank, Kleyn at one time could not 
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exercise his lending authority without prior approval from 
another officer. (Tr. 800-01) 
Timmons had no reason for rescinding Heslopfs lending 
authority or reducing West's lending authority other than the 
Gabbert loan. (Tr. 1287) Nelson testified that the action 
taken by Timmons and Browning was justified. While Nelson was 
the senior lending officer at Commercial Security Bank, he was 
frequently involved in disciplinary actions relating to lending. 
He changed lending authorities, took lending authorities away, 
and also gave them back. (Tr. 1396-97) 
9. Heslop's Resignation. 
After Heslop read the 9-29-83 memorandum, he spoke with Ed 
Kleyn and requested three days vacation to think about what he 
was going to do. Kleyn agreed he could take time off. (Tr. 
242, 77 3) Heslop indicated he might resign. Kleyn told Heslop 
that whatever he decided to do, to please put it in writing for 
Kleyn. (Tr. 775-76, 1475) 
Heslop sent an October 3, 1983, letter to Browning and each 
member of the Board requesting a special meeting. Heslop was 
critical of the Bank, its directors, and its management in this 
letter. (Tr. 245-48; Exh. 20-P) 
Heslop testified Kleyn subsequently told him the board had 
denied his request for a meeting and demanded he submit his 
written resignation. (Tr. 249) Kleyn is an area manager for 
First Security Bank in Ogden. His duties include supervision of 
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all operations, and all installment and commercial loans for 
eight of First Security's branches. He has a personal lending 
limit of $200,000, and in conjunction with another officer, can 
lend up to $1,000,000. He has worked at First Security Bank 
since 1984 when he left the Bank of Utah. (Tr. 756-57, 777-78) 
Kleyn unequivocally denied he ever told Heslop to resign or that 
anyone from the Bank ever told him to tell Heslop to resign. He 
further testified he did not ever tell Heslop he could not have 
a hearing with the board. (Tr. 788-89) 
Timmons did not instruct Kleyn or anyone else at the Bank 
to ask for Heslop1s resignation. (Tr. 1286) West never told 
Heslop to resign, nor did anyone at the Bank tell West to demand 
Heslop1s resignation. (Tr. 569-70) 
On October 5, 198 3, Heslop returned to the Bank and 
submitted his written resignation to Kleyn. (Tr. 250-51; Exh. 
21-P) On October 6, 1983, Heslop met with the full board, at 
which time he said if they did not order Timmons to restore his 
lending authority, Heslop would resign. (Tr. 1482-83) Heslop 
criticized the Bank and its management on several issues. He 
stated his resignation was effective October 18, 1983. (Tr. 
253-58; Exh. 22-P) 
Following Heslop1s statement, a motion was made to accept 
his resignation, which was passed unanimously. (Tr. 1093-94, 
148 3) Board member Spencer Baggs voted to accept Heslop's 
resignation because Heslop said he wanted to resign. (Tr. 1349) 
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Dee Hutzley voted to accept Heslop1s resignation because Heslop 
no longer supported Bank management. (Tr. 1447-48) 
By letter dated October 6, 1983, Heslop was notified his 
resignation had been accepted by the Board. He was paid through 
October 18, 1983. (Exh. 23-P) September 29, 1983, was a 
Thursday. Heslop took vacation on September 30, October 3, and 
4. He submitted his written resignation on October 5, and had 
his meeting with the board on October 6. He, therefore, did not 
work one day at the Bank after his lending authority was 
rescinded. 
10. Good Cause for Termination. 
Disloyalty constitutes good cause to terminate an employee. 
(Tr. 580-81) On several occasions, Heslop exhibited disloyalty 
through excessive criticism of Bank management and directors. 
Before Beutler left the Bank, Heslop was dissatisfied that 
Beutler was exercising too much authority. Heslop felt he had 
been reduced to the status of a routine bank clerk as a result. 
(Tr. 313-15, 318-20; see Exh. 39-Pa and 39-Pb) 
On December 23, 1982, Heslop wrote "Roderick Browning as 
Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer has 
been unable to manage the bank in a successful manner." Heslop 
suggested that new Bank legal counsel be appointed and that a 
new president and/or executive vice president from the community 
be appointed. (See Tr. 483-88; Exh. 39-Pb at 20-21) West 
testified an employee who says the chairman of the board is not 
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capable of performing or that the president should be relieved, 
is not a loyal employee. (Tr. 549) 
11. Evidentiary Rulings by Trial Court. 
Heslop presented evidence, over objection, regarding wash 
entries made by Beutler, Timmons' hiring and salary, and 
payments made by the Bank to Peat, Marwick during 1982 and 198 3 
in the amount of approximately $445,000. (Tr. 681-82, 803-11, 
830-31, 1112-14, 1564-65; R. 668-94) Regarding Timmons1 hiring, 
plaintiff's counsel claimed during cross-examination of Browning 
that the hiring was fl[a]n inside job" and that standard 
procedure had not been followed. Defendant objected, and the 
court admonished plaintiff's counsel that if he was suggesting 
impropriety, he better be prepared to back it up. The court 
questioned how hiring Timmons was connected to Heslop's 
termination. (Tr. 1118-19) 
Hearings were held outside the presence of the jury 
regarding the admissibility of evidence of Timmons1 salary and 
the payments to Peat, Marwick. (Tr. 1120-30, 1152-65) Addendum 
6 to the Bank's brief is a transcript of these hearings. 
Plaintiff's counsel claimed the evidence was relevant to show 
the Bank bought Timmons' silence about information he learned in 
his audit that was damaging to Browning and Kunz and could 
result in their suspension by the state. No such evidence was 
ever produced by plaintiff. (Tr. 1122-23, 1126, 1129, 1155-57) 
Moreover, three separate motions to compel production of 
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Timmons* salary information were denied during the course of the 
litigation prior to trial. (R. 52, 61-62, 66-67, 485-86) The 
second order specifically stated the information was irrelevant. 
(R. 66-67) 
Counsel for plaintiff claimed the evidence of payments to 
Peat, Marwick was relevant because they were improper. (Tr. 
1120-23, 1126, 1129, 1154-55) However, Timmons1 bonus 
arrangement was based on profitability. (Exh. 8 3-P) He had no 
incentive to increase costs by paying high rates to Peat, 
Marwick. The innuendo, however, was that the Bank was acting 
improperly and even that Timmons was receiving kickbacks from 
Peat, Marwick, one of the largest accounting firms in the world. 
(Tr. 1162) 
Although the court recognized this "evidence is obviously 
highly prejudicial" (Tr. 1128), he nonetheless admitted it over 
the Bank's objection and motion to strike. This ruling was made 
after the Bank proffered evidence to the court in chambers which 
explained the reasons for the payments to Peat, Marwick, and 
which the court recognized showed the payments were proper. 
(Tr. 1152-65) As a result of the court's ruling, the Bank was 
required to put on evidence explaining all the payments it made 
to Peat, Marwick (Tr. 1232-37, 1334-35, 1398-99), as well as the 
salary it paid Timmons and the reasons for hiring Timmons. 
Evidence was also presented by Heslop, over objection of 
the Bank, regarding the circumstances of termination of several 
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other Bank employees. (Tr. 5 36-40) For example, over both 
objection and motion to strike, the court allowed Beutler to 
testify that Kunz talked him out of a hearing with Commissioner 
Weis in August, 1982 following his suspension. Beutler was 
allowed to testify that he did not want to "take the fall" for 
the Bank. Beutler suggested that the Bank's holding company 
bought his condominium as a settlement for Beutler's agreement 
to waive his hearing with the Commissioner. (Tr. 869-74) In 
fact, Beutler later filed a lawsuit against the Bank for 
wrongful discharge, which was dismissed in its entirety on a 
motion for summary judgment in December, 1984. (Tr. 1478-79) 
While cross-examining Browning, plaintiff's counsel claimed 
Beutler "took the fall" for Browning and the Bank, which 
Browning unequivocally denied. (Tr. 1107-09) 
In addition, the court allowed Carlsen to testify about the 
circumstances surrounding his firing, which happened after 
Heslop left the Bank. Carlsen was expressly fired and escorted 
from the Bank the same day. (Tr. 722-23) 
Prior to trial, the Bank filed a motion in limine 
requesting exclusion of all evidence regarding the accrual 
account problem and the investigations of the problem on the 
grounds it was irrelevant under Rule 401, U.R.E., or was 
inadmissible under Rule 403, U.R.E. The court denied 
defendant's motion in limine. Copy of Order attached as 
Addendum 7. Defendant objected to this same evidence at trial, 
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which objection the court overruled. (R. 396-410, 487-88; Tr. 
131-32) 
After the court dismissed Heslopfs public policy claim (Tr. 
1149-51), counsel for the Bank asked the court if his ruling did 
not make evidence of the accrual problem and Heslopfs reaction 
to it irrelevant. (Tr. 126 3) The court stated the accrual 
problem was still relevant, but only with respect to whether the 
Bank had good cause to discharge Heslop, which would only become 
an issue if the jury found Heslop had been constructively 
discharged and that Heslop had an implied-in-fact contract 
terminable only for good cause. (Tr. 126 3-64) A copy of the 
court's ruling is attached as Addendum 8. 
However, the court did not instruct the jury that evidence 
of the accrual problem was irrelevant to the constructive 
discharge and implied-in-fact contract issues. (Tr. 1265-66, 
1267-68) The Bank took exception to the court's failure to rule 
the accrual evidence and everything related to it out of the 
case once the public policy claim was dismissed. (Tr. 1666) 
12. Improper Closing Argument. 
On three separate occasions during closing argument, 
Heslop1s attorney stated that Ron Draughon testified Browning 
and Kunz told him they knew nothing about the accrual problem 
before the August, 1982, Bank examination. (Tr. 1590, 1610, 
1654-55) This was clearly not Draughon1s testimony. (Tr. 976-
78) During cross-examination of Browning, the court 
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specifically sustained an objection involving this evidence and 
stated on the record Draughon did not testify that Browning told 
him he was surprised to learn about the accrual problem in 
August, 1982. (Tr. 1218) Copies of the transcript of Heslop's 
argument, Draughon1s testimony, and the court's ruling are 
attached as Addendum 9. 
Heslop's improper argument was that Browning and Kunz lied 
to Draughon, a representative of the Department of Financial 
Institutions. 
When the court overruled the Bank's objection to the 
admission of evidence of payments made to Peat, Marwick, he told 
Heslop's counsel: "We are not going to try the Bank for 
everything that happened during those years." (Tr. 1164) 
However, that is exactly what Heslop's argument was designed to 
do. 
Heslop testified he did not ascribe any criminal intent to 
the Bank's officers or directors. He told the Attorney General 
that. He memorialized it in his notes. He told the state bank 
examiners the Bank had 260 honest people. He did not tell them 
he was the only honest person involved in the accrual account 
decisions. (See Exh. 39-Pa and Pb) Yet, plaintiff's counsel 
argued, in substance, that Heslop was the only honest, 
noncriminal person among the group of officers and directors 
involved in the accrual problem. (Tr. 63-64, 1607-09, 1655, 
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1657-58, 1661) Copies of relevant portions of Heslop's opening 
statement and closing argument are attached as Addendum 10. 
Heslop's counsel further argued that the evidence of 
Timmons' hiring as president, his salary, and the payments to 
Peat, Marwick were unusual. He implied there was something 
wrong because Timmons signed several of the Bank's checks to 
Peat, Marwick. (Tr. 1610-11) Heslop's counsel referred to 
Timmons in closing argument as follows: "You remember Mr. 
Timmons, he was the one making all the money." (Tr. 1598) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ^ 
1. The trial court erred in denying the Bank's motion for 
j.n.o.v. because: 
a. Evidence of the accrual account problem, the 
investigation thereof, the hiring and salary of Timmons, 
payments made by the Bank to Peat, Marwick, the wash entries 
made by Beutler, and termination of other employees was 
improperly admitted. It was irrelevant to the issues in the 
case. It served to prejudice the jury against the Bank and to 
blacken the Bank's image in the eyes of the jury. The 
prejudicial effect of such evidence outweighed any probative 
value it had and affected the jury's decision with regard to the 
constructive discharge, implied-in-fact contract, and good cause 
issues. Browning's refusal to accept Heslop's offer to resign 
in January, 1983, cut off any causal connection between events 
in 1981-82 and Heslop's termination. 
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b. When Heslopfs lending authority was removed, he 
was not constructively discharged. He could still perform all 
duties of a loan officer, except to independently commit. The 
rescission of his lending authority would not lead a reasonable 
person to conclude that continued employment was intolerable. 
Heslop had a reasonable alternative to resignation. When an 
employee has a reasonable alternative, but nonetheless resigns, 
his resignation is voluntary, as a matter of law. 
c. Heslop did not have an implied-in-fact contract 
of employment terminable only for cause. He signed a written 
at-will agreement. Heslop and other employees subjectively 
believed the Bank's policy was to terminate employees only for 
cause, but that was not the Bank's intent. An implied-in-fact 
agreement cannot override an express at-will agreement. 
d. Assuming, arguendo, Heslop was terminated, the 
Bank had good cause. The Gabbert loan was a violation of Bank 
policy which occurred at a time when the Bank was under scrutiny 
from the federal and state Bank regulators with regard to 
problem loans. Further, Heslop was a disloyal employee. He was 
highly critical of Bank management, including the chairman of 
the board, the Bank's chief legal counsel, and the new president 
chosen by the Board of Directors. 
2. The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury 
that evidence of the accrual account problem was only relevant 
to the issue of good cause and should be disregarded in 
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determining whether Heslop was constructively discharged and 
whether there was an implied-in-fact contract, 
3. The trial court also erred by denying the Bank's 
motion for new trial because: 
a. There was insufficient evidence to support the 
jury's verdict. Rule 59(a)(6), U.R.C.P. Heslop had a 
reasonable alternative to resignation, there was no substantial 
evidence that he was asked to resign, and therefore his 
resignation was voluntary. The evidence of an implied-in-fact 
contract was overridden by the written at-will contract signed 
by Heslop and other employees. The Gabbert loan and Heslopfs 
disloyalty established good cause to terminate. 
b. The improperly admitted evidence set forth in 
paragraph l.a., supra, prejudiced the jury against the Bank and 
prevented the Bank from having a fair trial. Further, Heslop1s 
attorney's improper closing argument which misrepresented 
testimony suggesting Browning and Kunz lied to the State 
Department of Financial Institutions and that Heslop was 
terminated because he was honest were highly prejudicial and 
improperly influenced the jury. Rule 59(a)(1) and (7). 
4. Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd., supra, was decided 
approximately five and a half years after Heslop's termination. 
It made substantial changes in employment law. It should not 
have been applied retroactively to this case. Prior to Berube, 
it was not uncommon for courts to find employee-at-will status 
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if an employee had no agreement for a specified term. Had 
Berube not been applied to this case, Heslop would not have been 
able to sustain a cause of action. 
5. If Heslop fs testimony is true, then he had an 
employment contract to work until he retired at age 65, 
terminable only for cause. Such a contract is barred by the 
statute of frauds because it could not have been performed 
within less than one year since Heslop was only 29 years old 
when he was rehired in 1962. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE BANK'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V. 
J.N.O.V. may be granted by the trial court where there is 
an "absence of any substantial evidence to support the verdict." 
Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967) 
"[A] j.n.o.v. can be granted only when the losing party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hansen v. Stewart, 
761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988) . 
On appeal, this Court reviews the trial court's denial of 
the Bank's motion for j.n.o.v. to determine if the evidence was 
insufficient to support the jury verdict, and/or whether the 
evidence clearly preponderated in favor of the Bank so that 
reasonable people could not differ on the outcome. See W. 
Fiberglass v. Kirton, McConkie, Etc., supra, Onybear v. Pro 
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Roofing, Inc., supra, Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, supra, 
Hansen v. Stewart, supra. 
For the following reasons, the Bank requests this Court to 
reverse the judgment and the trial court's denial of the Bank's 
motion for j.n.o.v. and remand with instructions to enter 
judgment for the Bank. 
A. Improperly Admitted Evidence. 
A basic predicate to the Bank's position is that irrelevant 
and/or prejudicial evidence was admitted regarding the accrual 
account problem, investigations thereof by the State, the hiring 
and salary of Tom Timmons, payments by the Bank to Peat, 
Marwick, and terminations of other employees. All this evidence 
was irrelevant to the questions of constructive discharge, 
implied-in-fact contract, and good cause. Rules 401, 402, 
U.R.E. 
Such evidence did not have "any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." See Rule 401, U.R.E. There 
was no causal connection between that evidence and Heslop's 
termination. 
Even if it were considered relevant, the probative value 
was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the 
evidence on the Bank and was therefore inadmissible under Rule 
403, U.R.E. The evidence prejudiced the jury by intimating the 
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Bank committed criminal acts in bad faith, that the Bank's 
directors and officers were dishonest, that Heslop was the only 
honest person involved in the accrual problem, and in general to 
blacken the Bank in the eyes of the jury. Evidence which tends 
to influence the outcome of the trial by improper means, such as 
appealing to the jury's sympathy or provoking an instinct to 
punish or otherwise cause the jury to base its decision on 
something other than facts of the case is unfairly prejudicial. 
See Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institute, 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah 1979) . 
Heslop argued that evidence of the accrual account problem 
and its investigation was relevant to whether Heslop was 
terminated for good cause (R. 1106), and that the court's denial 
of the Bank's motion in limine regarding this evidence meant it 
was relevant to the issue of constructive discharge. (R. 1089) 
This is clearly not the case. When the court dismissed Heslop's 
public policy claim, he stated this evidence was only relevant 
to the good cause issue. (Tr. 1263-64) It was error for the 
court not to instruct the jury to disregard this evidence with 
regard to the constructive discharge and implied-in-fact 
contract issues. Absent this prejudicial evidence, the Bank 
submits it would have obtained a more favorable result on the 
constructive discharge and implied-in-fact contract issues. 
The Bank submits this evidence was not relevant to any 
issue. The underlying assumption for the position that the 
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evidence was relevant to the issue of good cause is that the 
Bank's reassignment of Heslop in January 19 8 3 and its removal of 
his lending authority in September 1983 was a pretext, and that 
the real reason the Bank took these actions was because it was 
upset with Heslop for his conduct in 1981 and 1982 and wanted to 
terminate him. 
This theory does not follow factually. If.the Bank was 
upset enough with Heslop for his conduct in 1981-82 to find some 
pretext for terminating him, then Browning's refusal to accept 
Heslopfs offer of resignation in January 198 3 makes absolutely 
no sense. The only reasonable and logical conclusion is that 
when Browning refused to accept the offer of resignation in 
January of 1983, any causal connection between the events in 
1981-82 and Heslop's leaving the Bank in October, 1983 was cut 
off. Browning's refusal is an independent, intervening act that 
precludes any such causal connection. The trial court based his 
dismissal of Heslop's public policy claim in part on the very 
fact that Browning's refusal to accept Heslop's offer to resign 
in January, 198 3, cut off any causal connection between events 
preceding that date and Heslop's termination. (Tr. 1149-51) 
This absence of any causal connection is further solidified 
because the Bank did not include Heslop in the June and October 
1983 reductions in force, clearly good cause for termination. 
See Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1989) . 
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Heslop argued lf[t]here was no evidence presented at trial 
that Browning was angry enough at Heslop to request his 
resignation in January, 1983 . . .•" (R. 1080) He also said 
fl[n]o one suggested that Browning was fmad enough to fire1 
Heslop at that point in time." (R. 1107) 
These statements are absolutely contrary to Heslopfs 
claims. Everything involving the accrual accpunt problem, its 
investigation, and the hiring of Timmons had already happened by 
the time Heslop offered to resign in January of 1983. These are 
the facts upon which Heslop relied to claim he fell from favor 
and that the Bank wanted to get rid of him. If Heslop is saying 
his conduct in 1981-82 was insufficient to cause the Bank to 
want to terminate him in January 1983, then it is irrational, as 
well as illogical, to argue that evidence of that same conduct 
is relevant to establish a pretextual reason for the Bank's 
rescission of Heslop's lending authority approximately nine 
months later. Such a position makes no sense. 
In addition, evidence of termination of other employees was 
irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible under Rule 403, U.R.E. 
Therefore, in determining whether there was sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict, evidence of the accrual 
problem, the state's investigations thereof, the hiring of 
Timmons, his salary, payments to Peat, Marwick, and termination 
of other employees should be disregarded. 
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B. Heslop Voluntarily Resigned and Was Not »
 { 
Constructively Discharged. 
The relevant evidence on the issue of constructive 
discharge was the reorganization of the Bank in January 1983 and 
the rescission of Heslopfs lending authority on September 29, { 
1983. This evidence was, as a matter of law, insufficient to 
allow a jury to find a constructive discharge. It did not meet 
the legal standard set forth in Instruction 15 that an employee i 
"must establish by a preponderance of the evidence deliberate 
actions on the part of the employer which amounts to harassment 
and makes or allows the employee's working conditions to become ( 
so intolerable that the employee has no reasonable option except 
to resign. ..." [emphasis added.] 
The jury's verdict also did not meet the legal standard of < 
Instruction 16 that an employee who resigns when there is a 
reasonable alternative thereto has voluntarily resigned. 
Heslop had a reasonable alternative to resignation in . 
October, 1983. He was still a senior vice president with the 
same salary. (Tr. 1094-95, 1286; see Exh. 16-P) He could 
perform all the duties of a lending officer except commit on 
loans without the approval of West or Kleyn. Heslop did not 
work even one day after his lending authority was rescinded. He 
did not attempt to talk to Timmons about the change. (Tr. 1286) 
Kleyn, West, Browning and Timmons all testified that Heslop 
could have continued working as a loan officer. (Tr. 569, 774, 
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791, 1094-96, 1286) His failure to do so made his resignation 
voluntary, as a matter of law. 
In Flanagan v. McKesson Corp., 708 F.Supp. 1287 (N.D. Ga. 
1988), Flanagan was demoted to the position of field sales 
representative after 17 years of employment. He resigned 
without working a day at the new job. He claimed constructive 
discharge. The Court granted summary judgment for defendant. 
The court cited Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 807 F.2d 1536 
(11th Cir. 1987) for the proposition that lf[p]art of an 
employee's obligation to be reasonable is an obligation not to 
assume the worst, and not to jump to conclusions too fast." 708 
F.Supp. at 1288-89 The court further held that hurt feelings 
due to a demotion do not constitute a constructive discharge, 
and that failure to work even one day after the changed 
assignment was unreasonable. The evidence was insufficient to 
present a jury issue. 
Heslop had an obligation not to assume the worst when his 
lending authority was withdrawn and to pursue the clearly 
reasonable alternative of working at the job for a reasonable 
period of time. Where he failed to do that, his resignation was 
voluntary. 
In Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 
1987), the court stated that an employee must prove he "was 
subjected to incidents of differential treatment over a period 
of months or years" in order to establish a constructive 
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discharge. 823 F.2d at 361. Heslop's claims do not meet this 
standard. The reorganization affected numerous Bank employees, 
not just Heslop. (Tr. 1053-54, 1056, 1065-66, 1247-48, 1474) 
When Heslop's lending authority was rescinded, West's was 
substantially reduced, and the policy allowing combining of 
authorities was restricted. (Tr. 568-69, 1091, 1283-84; Exh. 
16-P) Even assuming the rescissioin of lending authority was 
directed exclusively at Heslop, it is "a 'single isolated 
instance'" which "is insufficient as a matter of law to support 
a finding of constructive discharge." 823 F.2d at 361. 
The Utah Supreme Court discussed constructive discharge in 
Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979). Bihlmaier quit 
his job as manager of Carson's grocery store because Carson 
indicated on Bihlmaier's loan application that he had been hired 
on a trial basis only, which resulted in denial of the loan. 
Bihlmaier claimed he was constructively discharged. The trial 
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and 
plaintiff appealed. 
The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of the employment-
at-will doctrine, but stated, in dicta, that an employer can 
constructively discharge an employee if the employer's words and 
actions "logically lead a prudent man to believe his tenure has 
been terminated." 604 P.2d at 792, footnote 5 
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The court found that Carson's statement would not logically 
lead a prudent person to believe his employment had been 
terminated. Id. 
The standard to be applied is not subjective. The employee 
must prove a reasonably prudent person would consider the 
employer's words and actions to mean the employee was 
terminated. 
In Knee v. School Dist. No. 139 in Canyon Cty., 106 Idaho 
152, 676 P.2d 727 (Idaho App. 1984), Knee had a written three-
year employment contract as school district superintendent. 
During a regularly scheduled review of the contract, the school 
board demanded Knee's resignation. Although Knee asked for a 
chance to think about it overnight, the chairman of the board 
told Knee they wanted his resignation immediately. Knee 
therefore submitted his resignation that day. 
Knee later filed an action for wrongful discharge. The 
trial court found Knee voluntarily resigned and dismissed his 
action at the close of his case. Knee appealed. 
The Idaho Appellate Court affirmed and stated " . . . it is 
not appropriate to apply the doctrine of constructive discharge 
absent . . . harassment, intimidation, coercion or other 
aggravating conduct . . . which renders working conditions 
intolerable. . . . A mere request to resign, without more, is 
not sufficient to warrant a finding of constructive discharge. 
676 P.2d at 730. 
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In the instant case, Heslop's claim that the Bank expressly 
demanded his resignation was not corroborated by any witnesses, 
(Tr. 1559-60) In Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785 P.2d 1096 (Utah 
1989), the Supreme Court upheld a lower court's finding that 
plaintiff had no claim for wrongful termination based in part on 
its review of the record which revealed no corroboration for 
plaintiff's testimony on a critical fact issue. 
Wilson v. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs. of Cty. of Adams, 70 3 P.2d 
1257 (Colo. 1985), involved a claim of constructive discharge by 
Wilson, an employee of Adams County since 1962. Wilson was 
hired as a receptionist. Nine years later, she assumed clerical 
and secretarial duties. During the entire time she was 
employed, she was a substitute receptionist. 
In 1979, Wilson was given primary back-up receptionist 
responsibility. Wilson objected, claiming seniority, and also 
that stress from receptionist work caused medical problems. 
The assignment was not changed. As a result, Wilson took 
leave for several months, failed to return by a specified 
deadline, and was terminated. 
Wilson sued for constructive discharge. The jury returned 
a verdict for her, and the county appealed. The Colorado 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, directing the district 
court to enter judgment in favor of defendant. 
The court noted that even before the assignment as primary 
back-up receptionist was given, Wilson had worked as a back-up 
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for six years. The back-up assignment was within the scope of 
Wilson's job duties. Even evidence of medical or emotional 
problems associated with the job did not constitute constructive 
discharge. 
Wilson is analogous to Heslopfs case. Heslop complained 
when his duties were changed in January, 198 3 to commercial loan 
officer with a specialty in agricultural loans. However, Heslop 
had specialized in agricultural lending for years. (See Tr. 
547, 816-17) From January, 1983 until the time of his 
termination, Heslop was also a commercial loan officer, which he 
had been for years before the reorganization. His lending 
authority was increased after the reorganization. (Tr. 369-70, 
376, 392-95, 1054-55, 1249-50; see Exh. 2-P) 
In Christie v. San Miguel Cty. School Dist., 759 P.2d 779 
(Colo.App. 1988), plaintiff was a school teacher under contract 
to teach music for all grades. Her position was changed to 
permanent substitute teacher at the same salary. She refused to 
accept this position, resigned and sued for constructive 
discharge. The trial court granted a directed verdict, 
plaintiff appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. 
The court listed the conduct Christie claimed proved 
constructive discharge: 
Plaintiff argues that she met her 
burden by showing that: (1) she was asked 
to resign; (2) the district had a motive to 
force her to resign, i.e., it did not have 
sufficient funds to engage a "full-time" 
substitute; (3> the transfer was in essence 
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a demotion; and (4) the transfer involved a 
significant change in duties. 
Id, at 78 3. The court rejected all these arguments. It 
held that requesting an employee to resign, standing alone, does 
not constitute constructive discharge "unless accompanied by 
harassment, coercion, or other employer conduct which makes the 
working conditions intolerable." [Id.] Christie never 
testified that her working conditions were in fact intolerable. 
Heslop never worked after his lending authority was withdrawn. 
His claim that working conditions were intolerable without 
lending authority is purely speculation. Since he did work for 
several months after the reorganization, that change clearly did 
not create intolerable working conditions. 
The Colorado court also stated "the mere fact of a change 
in duties is insufficient to constitute a prima facie 
demonstration of constructive discharge." [Id.] Christie 
refused to perform her new duties. Heslop refused to work with 
rescinded lending authority. Christie ultimately resigned and 
so did Heslop. Christie was not constructively discharged, and 
neither was Heslop. 
In Adams v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Com'n, 776 P.2d 639 
(Utah App. 1989), the Board of Review denied benefits because 
the employee "'voluntarily left work without good cause.1" 
Adams appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Adams was employed as a mechanic with Facet Automotive 
Filter Company. Facet asked Adams to work the night shift for 
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two weeks because another employee was injured. When Adams 
refused to work nights, Facet refused to let him work days, and 
Adams quit. 
On appeal, Adams claimed he was constructively discharged. 
The court disagreed and stated: 
. . . Plaintiff argues that since he 
was given a choice of working the night 
shift "or else," he had no choice at all 
and was thus constructively discharged. 
Notwithstanding plaintiff's failure to 
marshal the evidence, it is clear that 
there is substantial evidence in support 
of the Board's factual findings. 
Plaintiff, not Facet, made the decision to 
sever the employment relationship. 
776 P.2d at 641. Heslop had a choice. He could continue 
working at the Bank subject to the limitation on his lending 
authority, or he could resign. He voluntarily chose to resign. 
In Lombardo v. Oppenheimer, 701 F.Supp. 29 (D. Conn. 1987), 
plaintiff claimed she was constructively discharged because her 
job duties were changed, her employer treated her coldly, and 
her new duties were monotonous and demeaning. The district 
court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Even 
though plaintiff's "duties did change somewhat," she retained 
"the same job grade, class and salary . . . [and] [a]ny change 
in her position was the result of a reorganization and not an 
isolated incident of agency mistreatment of her." 701 F.Supp. 
at 31. The court concluded "[pjlaintiff cannot claim a 
constructive discharge, where there was 'no more than a change 
56 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in job responsibility, based on a reasonable business decision 
[by] . . . the employer1." Id. 
The court also rejected plaintiff's claim she was 
constructively discharged because defendants treated her coldly, 
and because her job was monotonous and demeaning. This was 
simply a statement of plaintiff's subjective feelings. 
Heslop's subjective feelings regarding his new position in 
January, 198 3, and also after his lending authority was 
rescinded do not rise to the level of a constructive discharge. 
In Neale v. Dillon, 534 F.Supp. 1381 (E.D. N.Y. 1982), the 
district court tried Nealefs claim of sex discrimination and 
constructive discharge. Neale was an assistant district 
attorney with supervisory duties. She was passed over for a 
promotion which, while she was on maternity leave, was given to 
a male employee. The same male employee was given her office. 
When Neale returned to work following maternity leave, she found 
her personal belongings outside the office in a shopping cart. 
She was forced to search for another desk and was given a 
position with no supervisory duties. Neale resigned. In spite 
of all the above, the court ruled plaintiff had not proven 
constructive discharge: 
A claim of constructive discharge must 
be supported by more than the employee's 
subjective opinion that his or her position 
has become so intolerable and difficult 
that he or she must resign. . . . The court 
does not find that Nealefs situation had 
become so intolerable that a reasonable 
person would feel forced to resign. . . . 
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Although Neale was transferred to a non-
supervisory position, the transfer was at 
no loss of pay. The court finds that if 
she thought her position intolerable it was 
due to her own perception that the 
promotion of Schoenberg to deputy bureau 
chief and her transfer to the appeals 
bureau in a non-supervisory position were 
damaging to her prestige. While 
understandable, particularly in the context 
of the manner in which she learned of 
Schoenberg's appointment, and the 
clumsiness of her superiors removing her 
property from her office, her embarrassment 
does not constitute constructive discharge. 
534 F.Supp. at 1390. Finstad v. Montana Power Co., 241 
Mont. 10, 785 P. 2d 1372 (1990), was a claim by a petroleum 
engineer who had 22V6 years with his employer. When the employer 
transferred him from Cutbank to Butte, Montana, Finstad refused 
and claimed he had been constructively discharged. After a 
verdict entered in favor of plaintiff, the Montana Supreme Court 
reversed and directed entry of judgment for defendant, holding 
that Finstad had not been constructively discharged because he 
had the alternative of accepting the transfer, notwithstanding 
the fact it was undesirable to him. 
The jury's finding that Heslop did not voluntarily quit is 
not supported by substantial evidence. The Bank believes this 
finding was a result of prejudice engendered against it because 
of evidence improperly admitted. See Point I.A., supra. 
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C. Heslop Did Not Have an Implied-in-Fact Contract 
Terminable Only for Good Cause. 
The critical issue in determining whether an implied-in-
fact contract exists is whether both parties intended such. If 
the employee intended it, but the employer did not, then no such 
contract exists. 
The evidence, taken most favorably to plaintiff, was that 
various employees believed the Bank's employment policy was to 
terminate only for good cause. However, every employee who so 
testified had signed a written, express employment at-will 
agreement. The Bank used the same at-will language in its 
employment applications from the time Heslop was first hired in 
1955 until the present date. It was the Bank's intent to 
maintain the right to terminate employees at-will. Berube 
states "[an] implied-in-fact promise cannot, of course, 
contradict a written contract term." 771 P. 2d at 1044. The 
written terms of Heslop's employment agreement should, 
therefore, control. 
When a former employee was rehired, his prior written 
agreement was revived and continued in force. A new one was not 
signed. This occurred with Heslop and several other re-hired 
employees. (Tr. 693-94, 884-85, 1016-17, 1354-56, 1434) 
Even if Heslop's written agreement is not specifically 
controlling, the written employment applications established the 
Bank's intent that employment was at-will. It was Heslop's 
burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that that was 
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not the Bankfs intent. Other than Heslop's testimony, there was 
no substantial evidence that anyone in authority ever stated the 
Bank's policy was to terminate only for cause. There was, 
however, testimony from Beutler and Browning either that no such 
statements were made or they could not recall such statements 
being made. (Tr. 886-87, 919, 1017-18) Kennedy also testified 
he never made such statements when he interviewed prospective 
employees. (Tr. 1356-57) The Employee Handbook contained no 
statement that employees can be terminated only for cause. 
(Exh. 27-P) 
Berube was careful to limit the application of the implied-
in-fact theory: 
The ability of employees to bring causes 
of action based upon express or implied-in-
fact promises by the employer will not 
eliminate the at-will construction of most 
employment contracts. Courts have 
expressed concern that due deference be 
paid to managerial discretion and normal 
employment decisions. 
771 P.2d at 1045-46 (emphasis added). In Gianaculas v. 
Transworld Airlines, Inc., 761 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1985), the 
court rejected an implied-in-fact theory with the following 
language: 
. . . The employment application completed 
by the applicants expressly states that 
employment is terminable at will. This 
term contradicts the notion that the 
parties agreed to limitations upon at-will 
employment. As a California appellate 
court recently held . . . "[t]here cannot 
be a valid express contract and an implied 
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: contract each embracing the same subject, 
but requiring different results." 
Id. at 1394 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied). The 
only express employment contract Heslop signed made him an at-
will employee. Heslopfs implied-in-fact theory must fail 
because it requires a different result than does the written 
contract. For a similar holding, see Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum 
& Chemical Corp., 608 P.Supp. 1315, 1320 (D.C.Cal. 1984) (Noting 
that "[a] valid express agreement precludes a contradictory 
implied contract embracing the same subject" matter and 
rejecting an employee's implied-in-fact contract theory). 
Heslop claims his superiors gave him oral assurances of 
continued employment as long as he performed his duties 
adequately. The alleged conversations do not constitute 
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that Heslop's 
employment was terminable at will. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected an employee's claim of an 
implied-in-fact employment contract based upon his selective 
interpretations and subjective understandings of oral 
conversations with superiors. Rose v. Allied Development Co., 
719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986) . 
D. In the Alternative, There Was Good Cause to Terminate. 
Even if good cause was required, there was sufficient 
evidence of good cause, as a matter of law. 
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Heslop failed to meet the specific $50,000 condition 
required by his superior, Gerald West, before closing the 
Gabbert loan. (Tr. 430, 432-33, 557-58, 786-87, 1077, 1079-80, 
1278-79, 1388-89; Exh. 7-P and 12-P) Heslop misrepresented the 
facts relating to that condition when asked about additional 
collateral by Boyd Carlsen, the bank's loan review officer. 
Heslop falsely stated Dr. Gabbert invested $50,000 into the 
project. (Tr. 442-44, 446-47, 567, 714, 716-18, 727-34, 743, 
747-48, 753-55; Exh. 15-P and 55-D) Heslop knew that was not 
true. 
Heslop was highly critical of Bank management, to the point 
of insubordination and disloyalty. He stated Browning was 
incapable of running the Bank, that Timmons should not be 
president, and that Kunz should be removed as legal counsel, all 
clear statements in opposition to decisions which the Board had 
an absolute right to make without Heslopfs approval. (Tr. 48 3-
88; Exh. 39-Pb at 20-21) 
West testified that disloyalty constitutes good cause, and 
that statements such as those made by Heslop show disloyalty. 
(Tr. 549, 580-81) 
In Hutchinson v. Cartwright, 692 P.2d 772 (Utah 1984), 
plaintiff was employed as a county jailer in Beaver County. His 
deposition was taken as part of a lawsuit in which he was named 
as a defendant. His lawyer was provided by Beaver County. 
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During the deposition, plaintiff's "conduct . . . was 
marked by conflict with both" the opposing party's attorney and 
his own attorney. As a result, plaintiff was permanently 
suspended. 
Plaintiff sued for wrongful discharge. The trial court 
granted summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the employer 
was justified in terminating an employee upon evidence of only 
one incident of misconduct. The facts in the instant case meet 
that criterion. 
The trial court apparently believed the accrual problem and 
related evidence was relevant to the issue of good cause. The 
Bank disagrees. It's position on good cause is two-fold. 
First, the Gabbert loan. Second, disloyalty and 
insubordination, not because of Heslop's opposition to the 
Bank's method of resolving the accrual problem or anything 
Heslop did with respect to the state's investigations, but 
because Heslop was generally critical of the Board's major 
policy decisions from approximately December, 1982, until Heslop 
left, including the hiring of Timmons, the reorganization, and 
the new loan policy. 
The Bank had an absolute right to hire whomever it wanted 
as president. Heslop had no right to be made president. 
Despite plaintiff's innuendo and speculation, there was no 
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evidence of wrongdoing or misconduct associated with Timmons' 
hiring. Evidence associated with his hiring and payments to 
Peat, Marwick was not relevant to the issue of good cause. 
Heslop's failure to follow Bank policy and to meet the 
condition for closure of the Gabbert loan certainly provided the 
Bank with reasonable grounds to believe sufficient cause existed 
to take disciplinary action. See Kesterbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 
108 N.M. 20, 766 P.2d 280, 287 (1988). If this disciplinary 
action is deemed a constructive discharge, there was, therefore, 
good cause which eliminates any basis for Heslopfs claims. 
POINT II. 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE BANK IS ENTITLED TO 
A NEW TRIAL. 
A. Insufficiency of the Evidence. 
This Court can reverse the trial court's denial of the 
Bank's motion for new trial if "the evidence is insufficient to 
support the verdict." Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d at 17. 
Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6), U.R.C.P., the Bank is entitled 
to a new trial because the evidence was insufficient to justify 
the verdict or judgment or that it is against law. See Point I, 
supra. The verdict was against law because the jury failed to 
apply the legal standard enunciated in the court's instructions 
on constructive discharge. 
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B. Error in Law or Abuse of Discretion, Which Was 
Prejudicial and Prevented a Fair Trial. 
Rule 59(a)(1), U.R.C.P. allows the court to grant a new 
trial if there was some irregularity in the proceedings of the 
court, jury or adverse party or any order of the court, or abuse 
of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a 
fair trial. Rule 59(a)(7) allows the court to grant a new trial 
due to error in law. 
The improper admission of evidence regarding the accrual 
problem, the state's investigations thereof, the hiring and 
salary of Timmons, payments to Peat, Marwick, wash entries, and 
of terminations of other employees was error in law, prejudicial 
and prevented the bank from receiving a fair trial. It is 
impossible to reasonably believe that repeated references to 
these matters were not prejudicial or that they did not 
substantially affect the jury in rendering a verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff. 
A new trial should be granted even where the court 
dismisses the claim which was the basis for admission of the 
prejudicial evidence. In Almonte v. National Union Fire Ins. 
Co., 705 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1983), plaintiff brought suit on an 
insurance policy arising from a fire loss. At the conclusion of 
plaintiff's case, the court directed a verdict for defendant on 
plaintiff's bad faith claim. The court failed to instruct the 
jury to disregard the bad faith evidence. 
65 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The trial court denied defendant's motion for new trial, 
the Court of Appeals reversed and stated: 
Because of prejudicial error in failing 
to counteract the prejudice created when 
the jury heard these statements and 
evidence [concerning bad faith], this court 
has no choice but to reverse. 
705 F.2d at 569. In the instant case, the trial court did 
not direct the jury to disregard the prejudicial evidence after 
dismissing Heslop's public policy claims. The jury should have 
been told that evidence was irrelevant and should be disregarded 
absent a public policy claim. The Bank would have obtained a 
more favorable result had the court so instructed the jury. 
Doubts regarding possible prejudice should be resolved in 
favor of the Bank. In Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 
1985), evidence was admitted concerning the decedent's illegal 
purchase and consumption of alcohol the day before the accident. 
Following a defense verdict, plaintiff appealed. The Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the prejudicial 
effect of the evidence outweighed any relevance it had. The 
court resolved doubts in favor of the appellant: 
We do not know why the jury found Evan's 
negligence to be the sole proximate cause 
of his death. It may have been because of 
removing his life jacket. If so, evidence 
of his drinking was not prejudicial. 
However, we have no way of knowing this and 
cannot presume that the jury was not 
influenced by the evidence of his drinking. 
. . . The jury's verdict could well have 
been the effect of shifting its attention 
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away from the facts of the case and judging 
every one of Evan's actions before and 
after the disabled craft drifted away as a 
natural consequence of alcohol-induced 
debility. The probative value of testimony 
of so little substance coming in with such 
great latitude was clearly outweighed by 
the prejudicial effect it may have had on a 
jury. 
* * * * 
The erroneous admission of the testimony 
might be compared to a drop of ink placed 
in a vessel of milk. It cannot long be 
seen, but it surely remains there to 
pollute its contents. 
701 P.2d at 494. Further irregularities occurred due to 
improper conduct of plaintiff's counsel. 
In Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 748 P. 2d 
1067 (Utah 1987) the trial court granted defendant's motion for 
new trial because of "improper and prejudicial" closing 
argument. See 748 P. 2d at 1067-68 On appeal, the Supreme Court 
affirmed and stated: 
Counsel's remarks appear 
motivated by a desire to stir up the jury 
emotionally against IHC. We have 
previously held that "pleas plainly 
designed to elicit sympathy or to inspire 
passion or prejudice should not be 
allowed." Eager v. Willis, 17 Utah 2d 314, 
320, 410 P.2d 1003, 1007 (1966). 
748 P.2d at 1068. In the instant case plaintiff's counsel 
appealed to the prejudice, passion and sympathy of the jury by 
implying that plaintiff was terminated because he was honest, 
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that all of the other directors and officers involved in the 
decisions related to the accrual problem were dishonest 
criminals, and that Browning and Kunz lied to a state 
investigator, which was a clear misrepresentation of the record. 
Such misrepresentations show Heslop intended the jury to focus 
on facts which were highly prejudicial to the Bank. His desire 
was to make the Bank look as bad as possible in every aspect of 
its business, regardless of whether it bore any reasonable 
relationship whatsoever to Heslopfs claims, and after the court 
had dismissed the public policy claim. 
Another irregularity which prevented a fair trial was 
plaintiff's counsel's improper representations to the court 
regarding his reasons for submitting evidence of Timmons1 
hiring, his salary, and payments made by the Bank to Peat 
Marwick before and after Timmons was hired. 
Counsel told the court Timmons acquired information during 
the audit regarding Browning and Kunz which he could have used 
against them with the Bank Commissioner. (Tr. 1126, 1156) 
Counsel claimed this resulted in a sweetheart employment 
contract for Timmons, and subsequently to large, improper 
payments by the Bank to Timmons1 former employer (Peat Marwick). 
He implied Timmons was getting kickbacks from Peat Marwick due 
to the Bankf s payments. 
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Timmons gave no testimony which even remotely supported 
plaintiff's position, yet all the evidence with all its innuendo 
of wrongdoing by the Bank had been admitted. It was highly 
improper for plaintiff's counsel to represent the relevance of 
the above-specified evidence, when he knew he could not and in 
fact did not, connect the evidence to his theory of a 
"sweetheart deal" and improper payments. 
Evidence of termination of other employees was also 
irrelevant and prejudicial to the Bank. The facts surrounding 
Beutler's resignation were not remotely related to Heslop's 
case. Yet Beutler's testimony suggested the Bank bought his 
resignation. The Bank obviously disputed this, but it was 
another example of Heslop's approach to make the Bank look as 
bad as possible with regard to events that had nothing to do 
with Heslop's termination. 
The same is true of Carlsen's termination., He was fired 
and escorted from the Bank. He claimed the Bank treated him 
like a crook. It was a very emotional event for Carlsen. It 
happened after Heslop had left the Bank's employ. (Tr. 722-23) 
It had nothing to do with Heslop's termination, but again 
blackened the image of the Bank in the eyes of the jury. 
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POINT III. 
THE BERUBE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. 
In his concurring opinion in Berube, Justice Zimmerman 
stated: 
Because the law in this area is in a state 
of flux, and because the at-will doctrine 
has become well entrenched in our law and 
any change in it has the potential to 
affect the practices of almost every 
employer in Utah, we must proceed with care 
in recognizing exceptions to that doctrine. 
All that being said, we are reversing and 
remanding this matter for tri'al and are 
signaling a change in the employment-at-
will law of Utah. 
771 P. 2d at 1050-51. When a change in the law occurs, the 
court has discretion to apply that change prospectively only. 
Since Berube changed the doctrine upon which the Bank relied in 
the past, it should have been applied prospectively only and not 
to terminations of employment that occurred before the date of 
the decision. See Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). 
In Bimbo v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital, 644 F.Supp. 
1033 (D. N.J. 1986), the federal district court applied a change 
in the employment at-will doctrine announced in a New Jersey 
Supreme Court decision prospectively only and held that 
plaintiff had no claim for breach of contract. Bimbo contended 
she was constructively discharged as a result of a demotion, 
which violated her employer's personnel policy manual. Her 
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demotion occurred some three years before the change in the law. 
The Federal District Court refused to apply this change 
retroactively because it "would be distinctly unfair to those . 
. . who had previously acted in reliance upon the prior state of 
the law." 
Berube made significant changes in Utah's employment at-
will doctrine. Berube went beyond the exceptions previously 
identified in Rose v. Allied Dev. Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986). 
Rose recognized an exception to the at-will doctrine where the 
employee could show an implied or express stipulation as to the 
duration of the employment agreement. See 719 P. 2d at 85. 
Heslop's testimony was contradictory on this point. He said no 
one committed employment for any fixed period of time (Tr. 293), 
but also that he was promised employment until retirement at age 
65. (Tr. 296) However, Berube allows an employee to overcome 
the at-will doctrine by implication, not simply with respect to 
the duration of the contract but to the very issue of whether 
the person is an at-will employee. 
Berube also held mutuality of contract has no application. 
This is a clear change from Crane Co. v. Dahle, 576 P. 2d 870 
(Utah 1978), which held employees were entitled to quit whenever 
they wanted to and employers were entitled to fire employees 
whenever they wanted to. 
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The Bank relied on the at-will rule in the Beutler lawsuit 
and obtained summary judgment in that case in 1984 in part 
because Beutler was an at-will employee. At the time Heslop was 
hired, during his entire employment with the Bank, and at the 
time Heslop terminated from the Bank, the at-will doctrine was 
the law in Utah. More than five years after Heslop1 s 
termination, the Supreme Court changed the at-will rule. Had 
Berube not been applied to this case, the Bank submits Heslop 
would have been found to be an employee-at-will who had no valid 
cause of action. 
POINT IV. 
HESLOP'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS. 
Heslopfs claim to have entered a contract in 1962 for 
employment until retirement at age 65 terminable only for good 
cause was an agreement which by its terms was not to be 
performed within one year of its making. In 1962, Heslop had 
more than 30 years' work life left before he would reach age 65. 
(See Exh. 1-P showing Heslop's birth date to be 5-8-30.) Such 
a contract must be in writing, signed by the Bank or it is 
unenforceable under Utah Code Ann. .£25-5-4(1) There was no such 
writing. 
McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F.Supp. 1108 (D. 
Mass. 1980), held that an implied-in-fact agreement to employ a 
person until his normal retirement date was within the statute 
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of frauds, and absent sufficient proof of a writing 
memorializing the contract, was unenforceable. 
In Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F.Supp. 822 (E.D. N.Y. 
1980), plaintiff claimed he had an express or implied employment 
agreement terminable only for cause. 
The court rejected plaintiff's argument and stated: 
New York cases involving oral 
contracts for permanent or life-time 
employment have held that they may be 
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. 
Based on Heslop's own testimony of the terms of his 
employment contract with the Bank, it could not have been 
performed within one year and therefore falls within the statute 
of frauds. Since the contract was not memorialized in a writing 
signed by the Bank, the alleged contract terminable only for 
good cause is unenforceable. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bank requests this Court to reverse the judgment and 
remand the case with instructions to the trial court to enter 
judgment for the Bank because the relevant evidence establishes 
as a matter of law that: 
a) Heslop voluntarily resigned; 
b) Heslop did not have an implied-in-fact contract 
terminable only for cause; 
c) The Bank had good cause to terminate Heslop; and/or 
d) Heslop's claims are barred by the statute of frauds. 
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In the alternative, the Bank requests the Court to reverse 
and remand for a new trial due to insufficiency of the evidence 
and/or admission of prejudicial evidence and argument with 
instructions that such evidence and argument are inadmissible. 
Respectfully submitted this / J^ day of March, 1991. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By. 
Glenn C. Hanni 
Stuart H. Schultz 
Attorneys for The Bank of 
Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing document were hand delivered this / ^ - day of 
, 1991, to the following: 
Ronald E. Griffin 
Valley Bank Tower 
50 West 300 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Ivan J. Heslpp 
3/200051nh 
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ADDENDUM INDEX 
Rules and Statutes. 
Order and Judgment dated July 10, 1989. 
Judgment on Verdict dated August 27, 1990. 
Order dated October 16, 1990, Denying the Bank's Motion for 
J.N.O.V. or, in the Alternative, For New Trial. 
Bank's Notice of Appeal dated November 13, 1990. 
Trial Transcript, Pages 1120-30, 1152-65 involving hearings 
regarding evidence of Timmons' salary and payments to Peat, 
Marwick. 
Order dated June 13, 1990, denying the Bank's Motion in 
Limine regarding the accrual problem. 
Trial Transcript, Pages 1263-64, containing the trial 
court's ruling that evidence of the accrual problem was 
relevant to good cause issue after dismissal of public 
policy claim. 
Trial Transcript: 
a) Pages 1590, 1610, 1654-55 containing Heslop's 
counsel's arguments regarding Ron Draughon's 
testimony; 
b) Pages 976-78 containing Ron Draughon's testimony 
regarding his conversations with Browning and Kunz; 
c) Page 1218 containing a question to Browning on cross-
examination regarding his conversation with Draughon, 
an objection, and the court's ruling. 
Trial Transcript, Pages 63-64, 1607, 1655, 1657-58, 1661 
containing portions of Heslop's counsel's opening statement 
and closing argument regarding dishonesty and criminal 
conduct. 
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Rule 103- Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection, In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground 
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making 
of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being sug-
gested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof 
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is prove or disprove the existence of any "mate-
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable rial fact." Avoiding the use of the term "mate-
in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evi- rial fact" accords with the application given to 
dence (1971), but the former rule defined rele- former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court, 
vant evidence as that having a tendency to State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977). 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible-
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403- Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7-1-318. Reports of condition — Minimum number re-
quired — Form — Verification — Publication — 
Falsification or failure to file. 
The commissioner shall make not less than two calls annually for report of 
condition upon each depository institution under the jurisdiction of the de-
partment. The report shall be made according to the form prescribed by the 
commissioner and shall be verified by the oath or affirmation of the president 
or a vice president and attested by at least three directors. Except as provided 
in Chapter 9 with respect to publishing or mailing reports of credit unions, a 
copy of the report, duly certified by the commissioner, shall be published by 
the institution making the report in a newspaper having general circulation 
in the county where the principal office of the institution is located. Proof of 
publication shall be filed in the office of the commissioner within 30 days after 
the time of receipt by the institution of the copy certified by the commissioner. 
The commissioner may require a report of condition of any financial institu-
tion under the jurisdiction of the department whenever he considers it neces-
sary. 
(1) Any officer, director, or employee of a financial institution who 
knowingly subscribes or causes to be made any false statement or report 
to the commissioner or the supervisor having jurisdiction over that insti-
tution or any false entry in the books or accounts of the institution or 
knowingly subscribes or exhibits false papers with intent to deceive any 
person authorized to examine the institution or knowingly states or pub-
lishes any false report or statement of the institution is guilty of a felony 
of the third degree. 
(2) Every institution which fails or neglects to make a report within 30 
days after receipt of a call for any report required by the provisions of this 
title, an order of the commissioner, or any regulation of the department 
shall be subject to such penalty for each day's delay in transmitting such 
report as the commissioner may prescribe by regulation. 
(3) Every officer and employee of a financial institution under the ju-
risdiction of the department required by law to take an oath or affirma-
tion who wilfully swears falsely, is guilty of the criminal offense of per-
jury. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment 
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25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and 
signed. 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or 
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one 
year from the making of the agreement; 
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Glenn C. Hanni #A1327 
Stuart H. Schultz #2886 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7080 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IVAN J. HESLOP, 
Plaintiff/ 
vs. 
BANK OF UTAH, a Utah 
banking corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. CV-99381 
JUL 13 1989 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment was heard by the 
Honorable David E. Roth, District Judge, on June 7, 1989. 
Glenn C. Hanni and Stuart H. Schultz of the law firm of Strong & 
Hanni appeared on behalf of defendant, and Ronald E. Griffin of 
the law firm of Freestone & Griffin appeared on behalf of 
plaintiff. The court, having considered the motion, memoranda, 
and pleadings, and further having considered oral argument of the 
parties, now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Berube v. Fashion 
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Centre, Ltd, P.2d (Utah 1989), 104 U-A.R. 4, 
shall be applied retroactively to the claims involved in this 
case; 
2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to 
plaintiff's claims of breach of implied-in-fact contract and 
contractual wrongful discharge, including the claim of a public 
policy violation, is denied; 
3. Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to 
plaintiff's fifth cause of action for tortious wrongful discharge 
is taken under advisement by the court, and the court reserves 
ruling on the issue of whether a claim by plaintiff of a public 
policy violation by defendant constitutes a tort claim or a 
contract claim until the time of pre-trial of the case, and the 
parties are allowed to submit briefs to the court on that issue 
prior to the pre-trial, all subject to any clarifying decision(s) 
issued by the Utah Supreme Court on this issue between the date 
of this order and the date of pre-trial; 
4. Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to all 
plaintiff's remaining causes of action is granted, and judgment 
dismissing said causes of action, with prejudice, on the merits, 
shall be entered. 
Pursuant to the foregoing order of the court, and good cause 
appearing, now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
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1. That judgment of no cause of action is hereby entered in 
favor of defendant and against plaintiff on plaintiff's second 
cause of action for promissory estoppel and plaintiff's third 
cause of action for breach of implied-in-law covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing on the grounds that such causes of action 
in the context of an employee's wrongful discharge claim are not 
recognized, as a matter of law, in the state of Utah; 
2. That judgment of no cause of action is hereby entered in 
favor of defendant and against plaintiff on plaintiff's sixth 
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
with respect to such cause of action and that reasonable persons 
could not differ on the conclusion that the undisputed facts show 
plaintiff has no cause of action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress; and 
3. Plaintiff's second cause of action, third cause of 
action, and sixth cause of action are hereby dismissed, with 
prejudice, on the merits. S\ /? 
DATED this fO day of 
V 
ieWl989. 
/ v/ BY THE COURT 
Honorable David E. Roth 
District Judge 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Ronald E. Griffin" 
Freestone & Griffin 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing order and Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
P-% day of June, 1989, to the following: 
Ronald E. Griffin 
Freestone & Griffin 
50 West 300 South #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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RONALD E. GRIFFIN (4584) 
FREESTONE & GRIFFIN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Valley Bank Tower 
50 West 300 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-1500 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE CF UTAH 
IVAN J- HESLOP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Civil No. frTOS^ttl 
Honorable David E. Roth 
% 
The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable David E. 
Roth for jury trial on Monday, July 16, 1990, at the hour of 
9:30 a.m. The Court concluded nine days of trial on August 1, 
1990. Plaintiff, Ivan J. Heslop, was present at trial and was 
represented by his counsel of record, Ronald E. Griffin. 
Defendant, Bank of Utah, appeared through its designated 
representatives, Roy Nelson and Roderick Browning, and was 
represented by its counsel of record, Glenn C. Hanni and Stuart H. 
Schultz, of the law firm of Strong & Hanni. Sworn testimony was 
•' U < / 
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taken from witnesses called by both parties to this action and 
numerous exhibits were introduced into evidence. The jury rendered 
a special verdict through answers to interrogatories propounded by 
the Court. 
Now, therefore, it is hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against defendant for general 
damages in the amount of $160,000.00 together with costs, to the 
date of judgment, in the amount of $ / /£T/< ~?i¥ , plus post-
judgment interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% per annum from 
the date of entry until paid. 
DATED this <*- f day of August, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
David ^JRer€h 
Second Di s t r i c t Court 
- 2 -
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